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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court lies in Rule 48, RUSC, pursuant 
to the Court's grant of Plaintiffs1 Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari on July 6, 1989. This Court is reviewing the decision 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, Honorable 
Pamela Greenwood, Honorable Gregory Orme, and Honorable Richard 
Davidson sitting, in an opinion reported at 771 P.2d 677, (Utah 
App. 1989), unanimously affirmed the Judgment entered by the 
Trial Court, Third District of Summit County, Honorable Leonard 
Russon presiding, dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
and all causes of action brought thereunder following a trial on 
the merits. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's Ruling that Plaintiffs were barred by 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5 (1987). 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's ruling that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 
(1987) was inapplicable. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's ruling that Plaintiffs failed to show 
adverse possession. 
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4. Whether Plaintiffs properly asserted the Utah 
Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code Ann. §57-9-1 
through 10 (1976), and if so, is such Act applicable, 
5. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's ruling that Plaintiffs1 Claim for 
Prescriptive Easement was meritless. 
6. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's ruling that Park City Municipal 
Corporation was not liable for the act of an 
independent third party destroying a shack. 
7. Were Plaintiffs barred by failing to comply with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act §63-3 0-1 through 38, 
Utah Code Ann. (1989.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §57-9-1 - 10 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. §57-9-3 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5.1 (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9(4) (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-10 (1954 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-11 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-12 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-13 (1953) 
Rule 489, RUCS 
Rule 48, URCP 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title action to determine the ownership of a 
certain parcel of real property (hereinafter "subject property") 
located in Summit County, Utah, Plaintiffs Velma Marchant, et 
al., (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), also seek damages for 
destruction of a shack on the property. 
Plaintiffs claimed the subject property through a number of 
theories including superior title, adverse possession, 
prescriptive easement and boundary by acquiescence. Defendant 
State of Utah (hereinafter "State") claimed a superior title 
which had not been undermined by any of Plaintiffs1 theories. 
After a two-day trial the Court issued a five-page 
Memorandum Decision and thereafter entered a Judgment in 
accordance with its decision dismissing with prejudice all of 
Plaintiffs1 claims to the property and their claim for damages. 
The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, but subsequently the 
appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Rule 4A, RUSC. The appeal was thereafter argued to the Court of 
Appeals. On March 13, 1989 the Court of Appeals announced its 
unanimous opinion affirming in total the Trial Court's ruling. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is published at 771 P.2d 677 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Plaintiffs then petitioned this Court for a Writ of 
Certiorari, which was granted on July 6, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiffs1 Brief misstates certain important facts and 
omits other material facts upon which the Trial Court based its 
Judgment and the Utah Court of Appeals based its decision 
affirming the Trial Court. 
1. Abandonment of Subject Property. 
The earliest fixed date of claimed use of the subject 
property by Plaintiffs1 alleged predecessor was not until 1925. 
(TR. 29-30.) Any use of the subject property by any and all of 
Plaintiffs' alleged predecessors ceased and the property was 
abandoned by Plaintiffs in approximately 1964. (TR. 66-67.) 
Plaintiffs admitted to never possessing the property. (TR. 65-
66.) During the eighteen-year period from 1964 until this action 
was brought in 1982, the property was not used or possessed by 
Plaintiffs or by anyone through whom they claim. (TR. 65-66.) 
Every witness who observed the property, including plaintiff 
Merle Anderson, testified as to the abandoned nature of the 
property, including the vacant and deteriorating shack with no 
windows and no door, the unkempt yard overgrown with weeds and no 
discernible use of the property during the entire eighteen-year 
period prior to the filing of the action by Plaintiffs. (TR. 66-
67, 109-110, 217-218, Vol. 2, p. 6.) 
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The testimony of Building Inspector Ron Ivie, who inspected 
the shack on the subject property in 1981, is that the shack 
appeared to be abandoned and open without windows or doors and 
there was no sign of any repair or rehabilitation of the shack. 
(TR. 109-110, 118.) 
Plaintiffs1 claim of use of the subject property, after 
1964, by their own admission, consisted primarily of a single 
annual visit to the property which was uninhabited and unused. 
(TR. 65-69.) 
2. Payment of Taxes on Subject Property by Statefs 
Predecessors. 
According to the records of Summit County and the testimony 
of Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven Martin, the earliest 
record of payment of property taxes on the subject property was 
1931. (TR. 208, Ex. 43.) From 1931 to 1969 taxes for the 
subject property were assessed to predecessors in the State's 
Chain of Title, and were paid every single year. (TR. 203-206, 
Ex. 43.) From 1969 to the trial in 1986, the property was tax 
exempt because it was owned by Park City and then the State. 
(TR. 206, Ex. 43.) 
This testimony and records of Summit County were 
corroborated by Edwin L. Osika, Vice President and Secretary-
Treasurer of United Park City Mines Company, the state's 
predecessor and the owner of the subject property from 1953 to 
1969. (Ex. 32.) Mr. Osika presented proof of payment of real 
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property taxes on the subject property by United Park City Mines 
Company for each year from 1953 to 1969. (TR. 169-170, Ex. 35.) 
3. Payment of Taxes by Plaintiffs or Their Predecessors. 
While Plaintiffs maintained that their claimed predecessors 
had paid taxes on the subject property, Plaintiff Merle Anderson 
could only testify of payment for 1981 and one other year. (TR. 
69-70.) Plaintiff Merle Anderson also admitted that she had no 
knowledge of any payment of taxes by the Plaintiffs or their 
claimed predecessors prior to 1966. (TR. 70.) No other 
Plaintiff or Witness testified regarding payment of taxes by 
Plaintiffs or their claimed predecessors. 
Plaintiffs1 claim of payment of taxes prior to 1966 is based 
solely on certain exhibits introduced at trial. One such Exhibit 
(Ex. 13) is a letter from then Summit County Treasurer Reed Pace 
to Charles Rolfe which states that "In the year 1955 you paid 
taxes of $8.06 and in 1956 you paid taxes in the amount of 
$7.3 3." However, no evidence was introduced as to what property 
Mr. Pace was referring in his letter. Mr. Pace testified at the 
trial that he did not remember what property he was referring to 
in the letter. (TR. 182.) The letter was addressed to Charles 
Rolfe, Oakley, Utah, (Ex. 13), and could be referring to any 
parcel of property in Park City. 
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The only other exhibits upon which Plaintiffs rely for 
payment of taxes are several deeds issued by Summit County. Two 
Quit Claim tax deeds were issued by Summit County in 1914 and 
1917 (Exhibits 5 and 6), and a tax deed in 1963 (Exhibit 7). 
These deeds were issued subsequent to a tax sale. None of the 
deeds introduced by Plaintiffs contain a locatable description of 
any parcel of real property and were admitted solely under a 
Stipulation as to being authentic but not as to any relationship 
with the subject property. (TR. 31-32.) No seven-year period 
where plaintiffs or their predecessors paid taxes was identified 
and there is no other evidence of payment of taxes by plaintiffs 
or their claimed predecessors. 
4. Documents Through Which Plaintiffs Claim Title. 
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin 
to Jesse McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for "that 
certain one-story framed, three-room dwelling house 
situated on the easterly side of Silver Creek and about 
100 feet easterly from the lumberyard of the Summit 
Lumber Company." (Ex. 4 .) 
2. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William 
Rolph dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[iImprovements 
East U.C. Tracks, Pack City, Utah." The quit claim deed 
states that the deed is "made from title secured from a tax 
sale in the year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit 
County, dated May 1st, 1914." (Ex. 5.) 
3. A quit claim deed from Summit County to 
William Rolfe dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that 
certain frame dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah, assessed to William Rolfe in 
the year 1912." (Ex. 6.) 
4. A tax deed from Summit County to Charles 
Rolfe dated June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard," 
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stating fl[t]his conveyance is made in consideration of 
payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.53 delinquent 
taxes, penalties, interest and (Ex. 7.) 
5. Extrinsic Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs1 Deeds. 
No evidence was introduced which would tie any of the deeds 
introduced by Plaintiffs to the subject property. Exhibits 4 - 7 
were admitted into evidence under the Stipulation that they were 
authentic but that the Court would determine what, if anything, 
they conveyed. (TR. 31-32.) 
Both Mr. Pace and Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven 
Martin testified that they had examined the records of Summit 
County dating back to the early 1900's (TR. 179-180) and that it 
was, and is, a common practice of Summit County to separately 
assess and tax real properly and improvements constructed on real 
property if the improvements and real property were separately 
owned. (TR 179-180, 200-201.) Mr. Pace testified that if taxes 
became delinquent on the separately owned improvements, Summit 
County would treat the improvements the same as real property and 
conduct a tax sale and issue a tax deed to the improvements. 
(TR. 189-190.) If the improvements were not purchased at the tax 
sale Summit County would purchase the improvements later and 
issue a Quit Claim Deed to the improvements to a subsequent 
purchaser. (TR. 193-194.) The intent was to sell the 
improvements only and not disturb the ownership of the underlying 
real property. (TR. 182.) 
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Former Summit County Clerk/Auditor Reed Pace testified that 
the 1963 tax deed (Ex. 7) executed by him was a deed solely to 
improvements and not a deed to any underlying property (TR. 184-
186) , and that the grantee, Charles Rolfe, had purposely not paid 
taxes assessed against the same improvements in order to obtain a 
tax deed from Summit County to strengthen his claim of title. 
(TR. 183-184.) 
6. State's Deeds and Chain of Title. 
The Trial Court found and the Court of Appeals affirmed that 
the State had superior title based on the following chain of 
recorded deeds: 
1. A patent from the United States government to 
George Snyder on April 5, 1882. (Ex. 27.) 
2. A warranty deed from George Snyder to the 
Park City Smelting Company, dated November 
14, 1883. (Ex. 28.) 
3. An indenture deed from the Park City Smelting 
Company to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. 
Hollister on September 21, 1912. The deed 
did not contain a metes and bounds 
description, but described the conveyed 
property as "all of the real property or 
rights or interest in real property belonging 
to the Park City Smelting Company and 
situated in the County of Summit, Utah." 
(Ex. 29.) 
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis H. 
Witheyfs estate to Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company on November 5, 1926. The deed 
did not have a metes and bounds description, 
but conveyed "all the estate, right, title, 
interest, property, claim and demand 
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whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey . . . 
(of) the property above described." (Ex. 
30.) 
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister, 
Withey's tenant in common, to Silver King 
Coalition Mines on February 18, 1927. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds 
description but described the property as 
"all other real property or rights or 
interests in real property . . . belonging to 
Park City Smelting Company, and situated in 
the County of Summit, State of Utah." (Ex. 
31.) 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines 
Company to United Park City Mines Company, 
dated May 8, 1953. (Ex. 32.) 
7. A deed from United Park City Mines Company to 
Park City, dated April 2, 1969. (Ex. 33.) 
8. A deed from Park City to the State of Utah, 
dated June 7, 1982. (Ex. 34.) 
The patent from the United States (Ex. 27) contains a legal 
description undisputedly encompassing the subject property (TR. 
129-130.) (Ex. 25.) The conveyance from George Snyder to Park 
City Smelting (Ex. 28) likewise described a parcel of real 
property which contained the subject property. (TR. 131-132.) 
(Ex. 25.) 
While the deed from Park City Smelting to Withey and 
Hollister (Ex. 29), and the deeds from Withey and Hollister to 
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. (Exs. 30 and 31) did not contain 
a metes and bounds description, they did have general grant 
clauses conveying all property owned by the grantor in Summit 
County. All other deeds in the state's chain of title (Exs. 32, 
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33 and 34) contain metes and bounds descriptions which include 
the subject property. (TR. 147, 149-150.) (Ex. 25.) 
7. Demolition of Shack. 
In 1981, Deer Valley Resort Company was installing a water 
line leading to its resort. In the water lines pathway were a 
number of derelict and abandoned buildings. Deer Valley's 
pipeline contractor, Lloyd Brothers Construction Company, applied 
for and received a demolition permit from Park City. (Ex. 38.) 
Lloyd Brothers1 subcontractor then tore down the abandoned 
buildings, including the shack for which Plaintiffs claim 
damages. (TR. Vol. 2, 7-8.) 
On its permit application, Deer Valley's Contractor, Lloyd 
Brothers, represented that it had authority from the owner to 
demolish those buildings (TR. 96), and Park City relied upon that 
representation in issuing the permit. (TR. 96.) Park City never 
ordered the destruction of the shack. (TR. 120-121.) Park City 
had no other involvement with the destruction of the shack. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs brought an action claiming their father and 
grandfather, both deceased, had gained title to the subject 
property. The theories under which Plaintiffs claimed were 
superior title, adverse possession, prescriptive easement and 
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boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiffs also claimed damages for 
destruction of a shack on the subject property. 
At the trial, the State was able to prove an unbroken chain 
of title from the granting of a patent by the United States. 
This chain of title is superior to the claimed title of the 
Plaintiffs who rely on four disconnected Quit Claim deeds for 
their "chain" of title. 
Plaintiffs1 deeds fail to create any chain of title and are 
defective in failing to contain any locatable description. 
Additionally, three of the deeds purport to be from Summit County 
pursuant to tax sales. An examination of the law surrounding tax 
deeds reveals that one who had a duty to pay taxes cannot 
strengthen his title through nonpayment of taxes and receiving a 
tax deed. Alternatively, tax deeds cannot be a link in a chain 
of title, but create a new title. Therefore, the latest of the 
tax deeds, issued in 1963, either created a new title or added 
nothing, as did the other deeds from Summit County to Plaintiffs1 
title based on a 1906 Quit Claim deed. The 1906 deed is nothing 
more than a wild deed since it cannot be connected to any other 
grantee or grantor. 
If the 1963 tax deed created a new title, this title is only 
to the improvements described in the deed, since the State's 
predecessors paid all taxes on the subject property from 19 31 to 
1969. 
12 
Plaintiffs1 claim to the property by adverse possession also 
fails. Plaintiffs were unable to show any seven-year period 
where taxes were paid by them or their claimed predecessors. 
Also, the trial court, on evidence presented, found the use of 
the property to be permissive and not adverse. 
Similarly, the prescriptive easement claim is an attempt to 
misuse the doctrine to obtain all of the attributes of title. 
Finally, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that the 
shack was torn down by a third party acting independently and not 
the defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS PLAINTIFFS 
The District Court ruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed 
that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5 (1987) barred Plaintiffs. This 
statute of limitation requires possession or seizure of real 
property within seven years in order to bring an action for 
recovery of the real property. 
Plaintiffs' own witnesses testified that their claimed 
possession of the subject property ceased in 1964, more than 18 
years prior to bringing the action. (TR. 66-67.) Similarly, the 
deeds by which Plaintiffs could claim seizure of the subject 
property fail to describe the subject property. (Ex. 4, 5, 6, 
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7.) No evidence was offered at the trial which tie Plaintiffs' 
deeds in any way to the subject property. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROPERLY RAISE ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Even assuming, arguendo, that deeds introduced by Plaintiffs 
relate in some way to the subject property, Plaintiffs1 claim 
that §78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann. (1987) bars the State is 
meritless. 
At the outset it should be noted that Plaintiffs never pled 
§78-12-5.1 Utah Code Ann. TR. 12-15), and never asserted it 
until arguing it at the conclusion of the trial. (TR. Vol. 2, p. 
31.) Generally, failure to plead a statute of limitations 
pursuant to Rule 8, URCP, waives the statute, Staker v. 
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). In 
circumstances where no responsive pleading is allowed, a slightly 
more liberal standard requiring the party asserting the statute 
must "do all he [can] to assert the statute" was adopted in 
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d, 310 283 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). Under 
either standard, Plaintiffs failed to properly assert §78-12-5.1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1987) and have waived any reliance on §78-12-5.1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1987). 
Even if Plaintiffs had properly raised the statute of 
limitation found in §78-12-5.1, it is inapplicable. Depending 
upon which deed fits Plaintiffs1 purposes, Plaintiffs contend 
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that a 1914 Quit Claim Deed issued to William Rolfe after a tax 
sale, a 1917 Quit Claim Deed issued to William Rolfe after a tax 
sale, or a 1963 Tax Deed issued to Charles Rolfe evidences their 
"tax title" which is protected by §78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann. 
(1987) . 
In addition to the fatal defects in each of these deeds 
which will be discussed below, there is an inherent flaw in an 
argument which contends that three separate "tax" deeds, all from 
Summit County, are all viable. 
The Plaintiffs1 claim that the muniments of their title are 
found in a 1906 Quit Claim Deed from Belle McPollum. (Ex. 4). 
This deed predates the three "tax" deeds from Summit County. If 
Plaintiff's predecessors had title under the 1906 deed from 
McPollum, obviously these predecessors had a duty to pay the 
property taxes. The issuance of tax deeds or Quit Claim deeds 
after a tax sale by Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1963 evidence 
one of the following: (1) an attempt by these predecessors to 
misuse the property taxation and enforcement system to boot-strap 
themselves into a better title by failing to pay their taxes; or, 
(2) each successive tax deed created a new and distinct chain of 
title and the plaintiffs must claim title solely through the 1963 
tax deed (Ex. 7), the last tax deed issued by Summit County. The 
1917 deed, (Ex. 6), on its face states that the taxes had been 
previously assessed in 1912 to William Rolfe, the Grantee, who 
obviously owed taxes prior to 1914 and failed to pay them. The 
testimony of retired County Treasurer Reed Pace, who executed the 
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1963 deed, (Ex. 7), was that Charles Rolfe, the Grantee, was the 
person who owed the taxes on the "house in lumberyard11 for which 
the 1963 tax deed, (Ex. 7), was issued. Mr. Rolfe purposely 
failed and refused to pay the taxes in order to obtain a tax deed 
to the house in the lumber yard. (TR. 183-184.) The purpose of 
such a strategy is obviously to strengthen a weak claim of title. 
In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 1982), this 
Court held that: "One who is under an obligation to pay taxes on 
land cannot be allowed to strengthen his title to such land by 
buying in the tax title when the property is sold as a 
consequence of his omission to pay taxes." This Court in Dillman 
specifically held that one who purchases at a tax sale whose duty 
it was to pay those taxes gains nothing except the release of the 
lien for nonpayment of taxes. The Plaintiffs are urging this 
Court to overrule Dillman and rule that their claimed 
predecessors who failed to pay their taxes be rewarded with 
something more than the release of the county's lien. This Court 
has already rejected this spurious argument. 
This Court in Dillman also refused to apply the special 
statute of limitations found in §78-12-5.I1 to situations 
identical to the instant one. This Court observed that the 
policy behind this statute to give stability to tax titles should 
not be extended to one who has a duty to pay taxes and is simply 
The Utah Supreme Court also refused to apply the special 
statute of limitations for tax titles in a situation where one 
tenant in common had obtained a tax deed in Massev v. Prothero, 
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1982). 
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attempting to misuse the tax enforcement and collection system. 
The rule in Dillman prevents exactly the type of activity engaged 
in by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors, of attempting to clothe 
themselves with a title, and a limitation on the attack of the 
title, by willfully failing to pay property taxes. 
Alternatively, if the "tax title" deeds from Summit County 
are more than void attempts at bootstrapping a title by those 
having a duty to pay taxes, prohibited by Dillman, then the 19 63 
tax deed, (Ex. 7), created a new title. In Tuft v. Federal 
Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982) this Court affirmed the rule 
in Utah that a tax deed creates a new and paramount title and 
which totally destroys the prior title to the property. See also 
Dillman. 
Assuming that the 1963 tax deed, (Ex. 7), created a "tax 
title," an examination of this "tax title" and whether it is 
entitled to protection from §78-12-5.1 Utah Code Ann. (1987) is 
in order. 
First, if such a "tax title" were protected from question by 
§78-12-5.1, Utah Code Ann. (1987) the state and its predecessors 
would be denied their due process of law. In 1983, the United 
States Supreme Court in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 4 62 
U.S. 791 (1983), ruled that a tax foreclosure and sale was void 
for denial of due process of law if all lienholders did not 
receive actual prior notice of the foreclosure proceeding. In 
applying the Mennonite holding to an identical situation 
involving a statute of limitations, the Third Circuit held in 
17 
Benoit v. Pathaky, 780 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1985), that failure to 
give constitutionally sufficient notice was a jurisdictional 
defect which rendered inapplicable the special tax title statute 
of limitations. 
In the instant matter, what notice or what tax foreclosure 
proceedings, if any, were held and given at the turn of the 
century, is unknown. However, it was clearly established at the 
trial that State's predecessor and grantor, United Park City 
Mines Company, had no notice of any tax sale in 1963 which would 
affect its title (if it were to convey the underlying property) 
to the subject property since it paid property taxes without 
fail, on the subject property every single year from 1954 to 
1969. 
Second, even if the deeds through which Plaintiffs claim are 
shielded by virtue of Utah Code Ann. (1987), §78-12-5.1, the 
unassailable title is, at best, to improvements only since that 
is all Summit County had obtained and all that the deeds describe 
and convey. According to Harman v. Polter, 592 P.2d 653 (Utah 
1979), the description in a deed is prima facie evidence of the 
intent of the grantor in what is conveyed by the deed. All 
evidence at trial supported the prima facie presumption that 
Summit County only intended to convey improvements through the 
three deeds issued by it and not any real property, which Summit 
County had no title to anyway. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Plaintiffs have misconstrued the case of Parkwest Village, 
Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) in asserting that the 
Trial and Appellate Court erred in dismissing their claim to the 
subject property by Adverse Possession under Utah Code Annotated 
§78-12-10, et seq. As will be discussed below, Avise is 
factual y distinguishable and inapplicable. 
In order to obtain the subject property by Adverse 
Possession, the Plaintiffs must prove that they have complied 
precisely with all of the requirements for adverse possession 
found in Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-10, et seq., (1987). The 
Court in Home Owners1 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 
166 (Utah 1943), held that the party claiming adverse possession 
"has the burden of pleading and proving full compliance with the 
statute." This holding was reaffirmed in Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 
P.2d 979 (Utah 1979), and most recently by this Court in United 
Park City Mines Co. v. Estate of Clegg, 727 P.2d 173 (Utah, 
1987), where this Court held: "One who seeks to acquire title to 
real property other than by conveyance must comply precisely with 
the statutory requirements for doing so." (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory elements of Adverse Possession are: 
1. Possess land in the statutorily prescribed 
manner, for the statutory period of seven 
years; 
2. Hold the land adversely to title holder; 
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3. Pay all taxes legally assessed against the 
land for the seven year period. 
It is undisputed that a failure to comply precisely with the 
requirements of a single element of adverse possession causes the 
claim of adverse possession to fail completely. 
A. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Payment of All Taxes Legally 
Assessed Against the Land for any Seven-Year Period. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-12, 1953 as amended, requires 
that "the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all 
taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
requirement of payment of all taxes is a mandatory requirement, 
which if not proven by the party claiming adverse possession, 
will completely defeat his claim. The Court explained this 
requirement in its ruling in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. 
Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (Utah 1943), stating: "An adverse 
claimant has the duty of pleading and proving full compliance 
with the statute, including payment of all taxes lawfully 
assessed. . . ."2 
Prior to 1931, no evidence of payment of taxes on the 
subject property by anyone was available. Deputy Summit County 
Assessor Steven Martin was simply unable to locate records of 
See also Neelev v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979). 
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payment of taxes on the subject property prior to 1931. The two 
ancient quit claim deeds issued by Summit County (Ex. 5, 6), 
which Plaintiffs cite as proof of tax payment, only recite that 
consideration paid was $28.68 and $1.00, respectively. No 
evidence was offered that such consideration had any relationship 
whatsoever to any taxes assessed. There was no evidence as to 
what years of taxes the consideration represented. The deeds are 
entitled Quit Claim deeds, probably issued after a tax sale found 
no buyers. Plaintiffs1 bald assertion claim that Mr. Rolfe paid 
all taxes between 1910 and 1931 is simply not supported by the 
record. During the pre-1931 period, there is no record of any 
tax payment by anyone. If Plaintiffs are attempting to rely on 
the consideration recited in the Quit Claim deeds, their reliance 
is misplaced. In Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 168 P.2d 983 
(1954), this Court ruled that redeeming property at a tax sale or 
purchasing property at a tax sale does not constitute the payment 
of taxes necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for 
adverse possession. Thus any redemption or purchase from Summit 
County by Plaintiffs1 predecessors could not possibly satisfy the 
requirement that taxes be paid for a minimum of seven years by 
the party claiming adverse possession.3 
From 1931 to 1969, the State's predecessors and not the 
Plaintiffs' predecessors paid all real property taxes on the 
See also Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co., 107 P.2d 170 (Utah 
194 0), where the Supreme Court also held that redemption at a tax 
sale did not constitute payment of taxes required under adverse 
possession. 
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subject property, A letter from then County Treasurer Reed Pace, 
dated May 16, 1957, (Ex.13), reveals that Plaintiff's predecessor 
did not pay any taxes whatsoever for the period of 194 0-1955 and 
Plaintiffs themselves admitted to no knowledge of payment of any 
taxes prior to 1966 and only claimed payment in 1982 and one 
other year before 1982 and after 1966. 
Thus, at trial Plaintiffs simply failed to meet their burden 
by failing to show payment of all taxes assessed for any seven 
year period, and thereby failed to meet the requirements of Utah 
Code Annotated, §78-12-12, 1953, as amended. In Neelev v. 
Kelsch, 600 F.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979), this Court held: 
This Court has held an adverse claimant has the burden 
of proving full statutory compliance, including the 
payment of all taxes assessed. Kelsch testified that 
he did not know whether or not he had paid taxes on the 
disputed property, and he did not present any evidence 
of the payment of taxes. Since Kelsch did not carry 
his burden of proof, the Trial Court erred in holding 
adverse possession as an alternative basis for Quieting 
Title in Kelsch. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof 
and the trial Court and Utah Court of Appeals correctly so ruled 
on this factual issue. 
Plaintiffs1 heavy reliance on the opinion in Parkwest 
Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) is misplaced. In 
Avise, this Court recognized the Summit County practice of 
separately assessing and taxing improvements and real property. 
While the adverse possessor was able to show payment of taxes by 
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his predecessors for a period in excess of 2 3 years on the 
improvements, there was no evidence that taxes were even levied 
and assessed on the underlying real property prior to 1975. This 
Court ruled that until 1975 the adverse possessor's predecessors 
paid all taxes that were levied and assessed, since no other 
taxes were levied and assessed. Similarly, the successful 
adverse possessor in Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104 
(Utah 1987), paid all taxes assessed and levied on the surface 
estate or improvements for a seventeen-year period. 
Conversely in the instant matter, the County records show 
assessment and levying of taxes on the underlying property from 
1931 until the property became tax exempt in 1970. These taxes 
were paid every one of those years by the predecessors of the 
State. In order for Plaintiffs to be aided by the decision in 
Avise, they must demonstrate payment of all taxes that were 
levied and assessed on the subject property for a seven-year 
period. There is no holding or suggestion in Avise that the 
Adverse Possessor is relieved from his absolute statutory duty to 
prove payment of all taxes assessed for seven consecutive years.4 
Clearly the failure by the Plaintiffs to identify and prove 
payment of all taxes levied and assessed for any seven year 
period precludes them from obtaining the subject property by 
adverse possession. Even if Plaintiff could prove payment of 
Plaintiffs' citation of Affleck v. Morgan, 12 Utah 2d. 
200, 364 P.2d 663 (1961), and Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611, 
165 P. 471 (1917) is not helpful to this Court since those cases 
are factually distinguishable. 
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taxes for the required seven year period on improvements, such 
payment period must coincide with a period when no other taxes 
were levied and assessed. 
The purpose behind the statutory requirement of payment of 
all taxes by the party claiming adverse possession is to put the 
true owner on notice that his land is being adversely claimed. 
This purpose is stated in Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 
983 (1954). The true owner does not obtain notice during the 
years the party claiming adverse possession does not pay the 
taxes with a hidden motive of purchase at a future tax sale. 
Additionally, there is no identifiable location of the 
improvements on which Plaintiffs claimed to have paid taxes. The 
absence of any description sufficient to locate the improvements 
assessed is insufficient to put the State or its predecessors on 
notice of any adverse claim as required by Bowen. 
B. Plaintiffs Did Not Possess the Subject Property. 
The requirements for establishing of "possession" depend on 
whether the adverse claimant is claiming under color of title or 
not. Color of title is not necessary, but it makes the element 
of possession easier to meet for the adverse claimant. Claiming 
under color of title also affects the amount of land which can be 
secured by possessory activities. 
Plaintiffs, through their complaint, have not claimed 
Adverse Possession under color of title, but only claimed under 
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the non-color of title section. (See Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff!s 
Amended Complaint.) 
Plaintiffs, as adverse claimants without color of title, may 
establish possession only through the possessory activities found 
in Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-11 (1987). (This Section has been 
in effect and remains substantially unchanged since 1872.) The 
adverse claimant without color of title can thus only acquire the 
land actually enclosed, cultivated, improved, or irrigated. The 
statutory language allows claiming "the land so actually occupied 
and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely." Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-12-10, 1953 as amended. The adverse claimant 
without color of title does not have the benefit of the statutory 
section applicable to those who claim with color of title. Utah 
Code Ann., §78-12-9(4), 1953 as amended. 
Since 1964, Plaintiffs have failed to reach the minimum 
threshold of possession under either color or non-color of title. 
The testimony of all witnesses at trial, upon which the Court 
ruled the property was abandoned by Plaintiffs, was that 
Plaintiffs neither lived in or rented the subject property and 
only occasionally visited the property allowing it to deteriorate 
and become overgrown with brush and weeds. There were no fences 
or defined yard and no sign of any cultivation or improvements. 
Additionally, the activities of Plaintiffs failed to "give actual 
or constructive notice to the legal title holder . . . 
[sufficient] to give a reasonably prudent title holder notice of 
the claimant's intention." Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 
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(Utah 1982) .5 In order for conduct alone to give such notice, 
"it must be conduct that is inconsistent with the rights of the 
owner." Olwell at 587. In Pender v. Jackson. 123 Utah 501, 260 
P.2d 542, (1953), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that holding land 
for speculation was not a use sufficient to meet the requirements 
of adverse possession. The Court stated: 
Merely holding land for speculation is the purpose for 
which the land is held and not use of the land; we are 
not disposed to distort the phrase "ordinary use of the 
occupant" to a point beyond meaning. This is true even 
though a landowner is cognizant of the facts and the 
adverse claim became the necessary element of 
occupation, as defined by the Utah Statute, is not 
established. 
This Court in Pender cited with approval its earlier 
decision in Day v. Steele. Ill Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947), 
where surveying of the property erecting tie posts in corners, 
clearing greasewood from the property, placing a sign on the 
property, allowing a carnival to use a small portion of the 
property for a week, and placing fill dirt on the property were 
all cumulatively held to be insufficient to possess the property 
under the lesser standard of the color of title statute.6 
The possessory activities must continuously be of the 
character necessary under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-9 or §78-12-11. 
The adverse claimant need not occupy the land constantly in order 
See also Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 
1982). 
6
 See also Powell on Real Property, §1018, pg. 739. 
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to occupy it "continuously", but the adverse claimant's 
possession may not be sporadic. In determining what is 
"continuous" and what is "sporadic" the character of the land and 
the type of use to which it is being put are important. In the 
instant matter, the subject property is residential in character. 
Therefore, the complete failure to occupy the property since 19 64 
constitutes something less than "sporadic" possession and 
destroys Plaintiffs1 ability to claim ripening of adverse 
possession during this period,7 
C. Plaintiffs1 Use of the Real Property Was Permissive, 
Not Adverse. 
In Utah, "[t]o acquire title by adverse possession. . . the 
possession [must be] with an intention on the part of the 
claimant to claim title as owner and against the rights of the 
true owner."8 Since intent is generally unstated, it must be 
inferred from the possessory acts. The intent to claim title 
Even if Plaintiffs could show possession of the subject 
property during the past 1964 period, the window of opportunity 
for adverse possession closed in 1969. In 1969 the subject 
property was obtained by Park City, a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §78-122-13 (1986) prohibits 
property held by any city for a public purpose to be obtained by 
adverse possession. 
8
 Montgomery Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah, 3 
Utah Law Review 294, at 309 (quoting Dianan v. Nelson, 72 P. 936, 
937 (Utah 903). 
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will be inferred fl[w]henever the possession is of such a 
character that ownership may be inferred."9 
In the instant matter, the testimony at trial was that it 
was a common practice of mining companies in Park City to permit 
miners to build homes on mining company property. (TR. 157.) 
The statefs predecessors in interest, Silver King Coalition Mine 
Company (1927-1953) and United Park City Mine Company (1953-
1969), both permitted the use of their property, including the 
subject property, by employees and others to erect homes and live 
there. (Tr. 174.) Plaintiff Merle Anderson testified and 
Exhibit 15 showed that Plaintiff's father worked for Jim Ivers. 
(TR. 71.) It was also established at the trial that Jim Ivers 
was either president or owner of Silver King Coalition Mine 
Company. (TR. 175.) The 1906 deed (Ex. 4), by which Plaintiffs 
claim title, recognizes the permissive use of the underlying real 
property by referring to "privileges" in the land. Based on this 
evidence the trial court ruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed 
that the use of the subject property by Plaintiffs1 claimed 
predecessor was permissive. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence 
that the use of the subject property by their claimed predecessor 
was adverse rather than permissive. 
This Court should view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the judgment of the trial court and the findings of 
the trial court should not be disturbed unless there is no 
Montgomery at 309 (quoting Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. 
v. Board of Education, 99 P. 150,152 (Utah 1909). 
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substantial record evidence to support them. Harline v. 
Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah 1926). 
Once it is established a use was initially permissive, the 
inference and burden of proof of the adverse nature of the use 
shifts back to the adverse claimant to show that the use somehow 
became adverse. In Richens v. Struhs. Utah 2d 356 (1966), 412 
P.2d 314 17, the shifting of the burden is enunciated. The Court 
reasoned that unless the person claiming adverse possession could 
show that the use became adverse he would be allowed to "sneak up 
on the owner by using his property under permission and then 
after a lapse of time claim he was using it as a matter of 
right." (At 316.) Plaintiffs1 claim of adverse possession falls 
precisely into the category of behavior proscribed by Richins. 
POINT IV 
COURT OF APPEALS PROPERTY AFFIRMED 
THAT MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT 
DID NOT APPLY TO PLAINTIFF-APPLICANTS 
Plaintiffs assert that the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §57-9-1 through -10, insulates their "title" from 
challenge by Park City or the State of Utah. This is based upon 
a total misreading of the Marketable Record Title Act. In fact, 
said Act insulates the title that was obtained by Park City and 
conveyed to the State of Utah. 
The Act required "an unbroken chain of title of record to 
any interest in land for forty years or more . . . ". §57-9-1, 
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Utah Code Ann. (1986). (Emphasis added.) An unbroken chain of 
title is defined in §57-9-1 as when the recorded conveyances 
relied upon create an interest in (1) the person claiming such 
interest, or (2) some other person from whom, by one or more 
conveyances or other title transactions of record, such purported 
interest has become vested in the person claiming such interest. 
Plaintiffs appear to be relying upon two instruments, one 
being a Quit Claim tax deed issued in 1914 and another being a 
Quit Claim tax deed issued in 1917. The 1914 deed was a Quit 
Claim deed resulting from a tax sale and conveyed "Improvements 
East U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah. (Ex. 5). The 1917 deed had a 
different 
description of the improvements being "That certain frame 
dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, 
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912. (Ex. 6.) 
Neither of these deeds conveyed the underlying real 
property, but only the improvements. The Marketable Record Title 
Act would offer no protection for the underlying real estate for 
this reason alone. The cases cited by Plaintiffs are "land" 
cases and are not analogous. For instance, in Baker v. Goodman, 
57 Utah 379, 194 P.2d 117 (1920), a tax deed was found sufficient 
to give color of title. But the tax deed in that case was for 
"land" and is therefore not analogous to this case. Defendants 
do not contest that Plaintiffs' predecessors owned the 
improvements. The subject tax deeds cannot give color of title 
to property (the land) that is beyond the description of the tax 
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deeds. Therefore, the Baker case was improperly applied by the 
Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs cite Falcenaro Enterprises v. Valaley 
Investment Co., 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1974), for the 
proposition that their tax deeds and possession provided actual 
notice. This is also absurd. The tax deeds only gave notice of 
an interest in improvements, not the underlying real property. 
The possession also was consistent with employee ownership of the 
improvements and a mining company owning the underlying property. 
Not only do Plaintiffs fail to show compliance with the 
Marketable Record Title act by not having root deeds to the 
"land", but also fail to show "an unbroken chain of title" for at 
least forty years. There are no subsequent conveyances from 
William Rolfe to anyone else, including the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs clearly cannot meet this requirement to invoke the 
Act. Additionally, there are recorded conveyances in the State's 
chain of title in 1926, 1927, 1953, 1969, and 1982, which purport 
to divest the Plaintiffs of any interest in the subject property. 
(Exs. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.) 
±t is entirely fallacious for the Plaintiffs to be 
challenging the District Court decision and the affirming thereof 
by the Utah Court of Appeals by relying upon the Marketable 
Record Title Act, because the Act protects the title obtained by 
Park City and conveyed to the State of Utah. 
The State's title is rooted in the patent issued by the 
United States Government on April 5, 1882, to George Snyder which 
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indisputably includes the subject property. (Ex. 25 and Ex. 27.) 
The patent on its face, indicates that it was duly recorded in 
the records of the Summit County Recorder. 
On November 14, 1883, George Snyder conveyed, by Warranty 
Deed, a portion of the real property acquired by said patent, 
which also indisputably contains the subject property, to the 
Park City Smelting Company. (Ex. 25 and Ex. 28.) This deed was 
also recorded in the records of the Summit County Recorder. (Ex. 
28.) 
On November 21, 1912, the Park City Smelting Company 
conveyed title to all of their property in Summit County, by 
Indenture Deed, to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister. (Ex. 
29). This deed was also duly recorded in the records of the 
Summit County Recorder. (Ex. 29.) 
On November 5, 1926, the executors of the Last Will of Lewis 
H. Withey, deceased, a tenant in common with Clay H. Hollister, 
conveyed, by Deed, Withey1s interest to Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company. (Ex. 3 0.) 
On February 5, 1927, Clay H. Hollister conveyed, by deed, to 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company. This deed was recorded in 
the records of the Summit County Recorder. (Ex. 31.) 
At this point, the Marketable Record Title Act, having had 
forty years of record title already pass, protects the title of 
the State's predecessors. Section 57-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. Nevertheless, through a series of duly recorded 
32 
deeds, title passed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to 
the State of Utah. (Exs. 32, 33, and 34.) 
It is therefore the State that has the more than forty years 
of continuous record title which should be protected by the Act 
from the challenge of the Plaintiffs. The Act never intended to 
pass title beyond the description of the root deed. Therefore, 
the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court 
decision by not granting the Plaintiffs relief (ownership of the 
underlying property) under said Act. 
POINT V 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Plaintiffs have claimed a prescriptive easement as the alter 
ego of adverse possession. Plaintiffs would have this Court rule 
that if a person seeking adverse possession fails to establish 
the elements for adverse possession, he may obtain all of the 
attributes of ownership by prescriptive easement. In other 
words, Plaintiffs are attempting to gain title to the subject 
property prescriptively without proving all of the elements 
necessary to gain title by adverse possession. An easement of 
the scope claimed by Plaintiffs is actually not an easement at 
all; it is a fee simple interest. 
An easement, as distinguished from ownership, is a mere 
right to use the land of another for a limited purpose. This 
Court has described the interlocking interests of owner and 
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easement holder created by the existence of an easement in the 
following terms: 
Whenever there is ownership of property subject to an 
easement there is a dichotomy of interests, both of 
which must be represented and kept in balance. On the 
one hand, it is to be realized that the owner of the 
fee title, because of his general ownership, should 
have the use and enjoyment of his property to the 
highest degree possible, not inconsistent with the 
easement. One the other, the owner of the easement 
should likewise have the right to use and enjoy his 
easement to the fullest extent possible not 
inconsistent with the rights of the fee owner. 
North Union Canal Company v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 
1976) (citations omitted).10 This formulation of balanced rights 
assumes that the owner of the servient tenement retains some 
rights in the land. The extent of the "easement" claimed by 
Plaintiffs leaves no rights to the fee owner, the State. 
The concept of "easement" clearly addresses use, as 
distinguished from occupation and enjoyment of land. While this 
Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the nature of 
this distinction, the distinction has been recognized by Courts 
throughout the nation. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized this 
distinction in its opinion in this matter and the Illinois 
Supreme Court observed: 
There are . . . rights to be exercised in connection 
with corporal things but without any ownership, 
possession, control or power of disposition of the 
,u
 See also United States v. O1Block, 788 F.2d 1433 (10th 
Cir. 1986). 
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thing in connection with which the power may be 
exercised and without any profit therein, such as a 
right to pass over another's land; . . . These are 
easements which consist in the right of the owner of 
one parcel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use 
the land of another for a special purpose not 
inconsistent with the general property in the owner, 
and these are always distinct from the occupation and 
enjoyment of the land itself. [Citations omitted.] 
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emerson, 131 N.E. 645, 648 (111. 
1921) . 
Our neighboring jurisdiction of Colorado described the 
limits of the extent of easement rights as follows: "[WJhile 
plaintiff had obtained an easement by prescription, it had not 
acquired title to the land over which it flows. The easement, 
therefor, should not work a dispossession of the landowner." 
Osborn & Claywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. 
1983). (Emphasis added.)11 
Plaintiffs1 claimed "easement" over the subject property is 
essentially inconsistent with both the "general ownership," 
(North Union Canal at 179), of the fee owner and the "use and 
enjoyment," (Id. at 179), pursuant thereto that the Utah Supreme 
Court contemplates in its concept of an "easement." (Id. at 
179. ) 1 2 Plaintiffs claim the right to the exclusive use and 
The West Virginia and Missouri Courts are also in 
accord. See Ballanges v. Becklev Coal & Supply Co., 161 S.E. 
562, 563 (W. Va. 1931); and St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia 
Corp., 471 S.W. 2d 238, 246 (Mo. 1971). 
12
 See also Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 
1982); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978); Flying 
Diamond v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976). 
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enjoyment of the entire surface. Plaintiffs claim the right to 
alienate, devise and assign that right of exclusive use. 
Plaintiffs claim the right to profit from the land by leasing 
that right of exclusive use to others. Plaintiffs claim the 
right to maintain a dwelling on the land and to use the land as 
they see fit without regard to the fee owner's interests. The 
sum of the rights claimed by Plaintiffs leaves nothing to the 
State that can qualify as a "general ownership." 
In short, Plaintiffs are seeking ownership of the property 
in dispute through a misapplication of the Prescriptive Easement 
Doctrine. The result urged by Plaintiffs has never been reached 
by any Court in Utah or the nation. The granting of such a 
prescriptive easement would also subvert adverse possession and 
violate the public policy behind the requirement of payment of 
taxes so as to put the record owner on notice. See Bowen v. 
Qlsen, 2 Utah 2d, 268 P.2d 983 (1954). If this Court adopts the 
application of Prescriptive easements urged by Plaintiffs, the 
requirement of payment of taxes in Utah Code Ann., §78-12-12 
(1987), would be rendered meaningless. 
The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their claim of 
prescriptive easement are all factually distinguishable and 
inapplicable to the instant matter. 
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POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS DEEDS ARE NULL AND VOID 
Plaintiffs rely on four deeds through which they claimed 
title to the subject property. (Exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7.) A 
common element of all of Plaintiffs' deeds is the complete 
absence of any locatable description of real property. The Trial 
Court specifically found and the Court of Appeals affirmed that 
all deeds upon which the Plaintiffs rely were void for lack of a 
description by which the property to be conveyed could be located 
or even identified. (Rec. 368.) 
It is well-settled Utah law that fla deed must contain a 
sufficiently definite description to identify the property it 
conveys". Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 305 (Utah 1976). 
If, after applying the rules of construction which are generally 
applicable to controversies over the meaning of documents to the 
deed in question, the Court is still unable to identify the 
property the deed is attempting to convey, then the deed is null 
and void. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has upheld descriptions in 
option agreements which identified the property by street address 
in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986), 
and Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the descriptions in 
the Plaintiffs1 deeds do not contain even a street address to 
identify any specific property. The opportunity to resort to 
reasonable inferences and extrinsic evidence at the trial as 
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prescribed in Colman, did not yield any clue as to the 
relationship, if any, between the improvements referred to in the 
plaintiffs deeds and the subject property. 
The lack of any description in these deeds sufficient to 
locate or identify the property to be conveyed distinguishes 
these deeds from the deed in Colman. The use of commonly 
employed abbreviations in the legal description in the Colman 
deed was not fatal because there was "a sound basis for the trial 
courts conclusion that the description in the deed was 
sufficiently definite to convey the property in question." 
(Colman at 505.) The trial court was not able to make any such 
conclusion in the instant matter. The only testimony regarding 
Plaintiffs1 deeds given at trial was that the Plaintiffs found 
the deeds among papers at their mothers1 or fathers1 homes or 
among their families1 legal documents. (TR. 34, 3 6.) No 
testimony was given which could have assisted the Court in 
relating the deeds offered by Plaintiffs to any parcel of real 
property. With no parol evidence which would assist the Court in 
fixing the location of the ambiguous and uncertain descriptions 
in the deeds, the Court's only alternative was to rule that the 
deeds, upon which Plaintiffs rely, were void for lack of 
descriptions. 
It should also be noted that in Utah deeds are held to a 
higher standard in contrast with other documents such as options. 
In Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407, 367 P.2d 193, (1952), this 
Court held that a warranty deed was a nullity simply because the 
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deed's description failed to close on the fifth and sixth 
courses. The deeds on which the Plaintiffs1 reply in the instant 
matter do not even contain an identifiable description of real 
property. The Court in Howard held: 
Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in 
mind or, conjecture indulged one would have to divine 
that any number of areas could be said to have been 
intended. In such case, abstractors and lawyers should 
be able to turn down a title based on the contentions 
of such an illusory intention of a deceased. (at 195). 
It is clearly beyond dispute that if a deed with a defective 
legal description is fatally deficient, then the Plaintiffs1 
deeds with no locatable or identifiable legal descriptions and no 
clue as to the Grantors1 intent, are even more fatally deficient. 
The only party to the 1963 Deed, (Ex. 7), who testified is 
retired Summit County Auditor Reed Pace. Mr. Pace's testimony 
was that the deed he executed (Ex. 7) conveyed title only to the 
improvements described in the deed and not to any underlying real 
property. Mr. Pace further testified that he did not know the 
location of the improvements referred to in the deed he executed. 
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are asking this Court 
to ignore the well-founded requirement in Utah that deeds 
identify the property they are to convey, and to rule that the 
vague and unlocatable descriptions in the Plaintiffs' deeds are 
sufficient to quiet title in the Plaintiffs to the real property 
described in their Complaint. This is clearly contrary to 
settled Utah law. 
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The rule in Utah, which requires a deed to contain a 
description sufficient to identify the property, is well founded 
and followed throughout the United States.13 Additionally, Tax 
Deeds are routinely held to even higher standards of certainty of 
their description than inter-party deeds. The New Mexico Supreme 
Court in Brylinski v. Cooper, 624 P.2d 522 (New Mexico 1981), 
held that a description of a tax deed must describe the property 
to be conveyed. The Court refused to allow the use of extrinsic 
evidence to identify the property to be conveyed. The reason 
extrinsic evidence could not be used is that tax deeds must give 
notice to the foreclosed owner and the public of what particular 
property is being conveyed.14 
POINT VII 
THE STATE HOLDS SUPERIOR TITLE 
If, arguendo, the Plaintiffs1 deeds were valid, the chain of 
title through which the State claims the subject real property is 
still clearly the superior chain of title. Plaintiffs do not 
have a chain of title. The Plaintiffs1 deeds are a series of 
quit claim deeds, and a tax deed from Summit County. There are 
See Boone v. Pritchett, 130 Se.2d 288 (North Carolina 
1963); MacKubbin v. Rosedale Memorial Park, Inc., 198 A.2d 856 
(Pennsylvania 1964); See also 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed. 
Sec. 990. 
14
 See also Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1967) 
and Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982). 
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no deeds from any of the Grantees to any one else, and none from 
any Grantee or Grantor to any of the Plaintiffs. There are 
simply four disconnected deeds upon which the Trial Court 
properly ruled and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that 
the chain of title of Plaintiffs was discontinuous. (Rec. 368.) 
In contrast, the chain of title of the State is an unbroken 
chain back to the original source, the Patent issued by Chester 
A. Arthur, as President of the United States. This is a complete 
and perfect chain of title as defined by this Court and no proof 
of actual possession is needed. In Music Service Corporation v. 
Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20 Utah 2d 16 (1967), the Utah Supreme 
Court cited with approval Cottrell v. Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 
P. 696 (1907), and held that: "Of course, where one proved a 
perfect chain of paper title from its original source, no proof 
of actual possession is required. In such event the presumption 
would be all sufficient and the title would be a complete and 
perfect title." (Rec. at 336.) 
The only expert title abstractor who testified at trial, 
Nick Butkovich, testified that State's chain of title was 
superior to Plaintiffs1. (TR. 156.) 
Finally, Plaintiffs1 claim of a chain of title is further 
barred by an attempt to claim tax deed(s) as part of their chain 
of title. It is settled Utah law that a tax deed either adds 
nothing to title if the tax deed is obtained by the party who 
actually owed the taxes, or creates a new title if the tax deed 
is obtained by a third party who had no duty to pay taxes. 
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This rule of law is set forth in Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 
974 (Utah 1982), and Tuft v. Federal Leasing. 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 
1982). 
POINT VIII 
TAXATION AND FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE BY SUMMIT COUNTY 
AT BEST CONVEYED IMPROVEMENTS AND MAY BE VOID 
The trial of this matter brought to light once again the 
practice of Summit County to separately assess and tax 
improvements from the real property upon which the improvements 
were constructed if there is separate ownership. This Court had 
previously encountered this practice in Parkwest Village v. 
Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986)• 
Plaintiffs point out that Summit County was authorized 
pursuant to Section 2 655, compiled laws of Utah, to sell Real 
Estate at Tax Sales. Real Estate is defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, to include improvements to real 
property. Therefore, Plaintiffs argument that real estate and 
real property are synonymous is not well founded. The practice 
of selling real estate, i.e., improvements, did not disturb the 
underlying real property. 
However, even if Plaintiffs argument is then accepted, this 
practice of separately assessing improvements was illegal and 
ultra-vires, this Court cannot conclude that a tax deed issued by 
Summit County for improvements only passes title as well to the 
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underlying real property. Such a conclusion is prohibited by 
controlling constitutional law and this Court's prior rulings. 
Rather than broadly constructing the ultra-vires acts of 
Summit County in tax assessment, foreclosure and sale, this Court 
has uniformly held that tax assessment, foreclosure and sale 
should be strictly and narrowly construed. In Frederickson v. La 
Fleur, 632 P.2d 827, 828 (Utah 1987), Justice Oaks wrote: 
American courts have long looked upon tax titles with a 
jaundiced eye. Like the courts of most other States, 
this Court has consistently held that statutes 
providing for the sale of tax delinquent lands and the 
issuance of tax deeds pursuant to such sales are to be 
construed narrowly and in favor of the tax debtor. 
Not only are such activities to be construed narrowly and 
strictly, but other jurisdictions which, unlike Utah, have had 
the opportunity to rule, have consistently ruled that a tax deed 
can only convey that property which was assessed and obtained for 
non-payment of taxes. In Webermier v. Pace, 552 P.2d 1021, 1024 
(Colo. 1976), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that "the 
grantee of a tax deed secures title to no more than that owned by 
the Grantee's predecessor in title." 
In Webermier, a person only owned the mineral rights to coal 
in a certain parcel of real property. This person's ownership 
rights were foreclosed for non-payment of taxes and a deed was 
See also Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 
2d 402, 464 P.,2d 392 (1970) and Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc., 
v. Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1965). 
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issued by the County after tax sale, which purported to convey 
all mineral rights. The Court held that the deed only conveyed 
ownership rights to coal through the tax foreclosure and could 
only convey what it had obtained. The ownership of the other 
mineral interest holders could not be disturbed and grantees of 
the tax deeds had no claim to other mineral interests, regardless 
of the description of the tax deed. The Utah Court in Hayes v. 
Gibb, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 731 (1946), held that only the 
interest that is properly assessed is sold at a tax sale. 
At most, Plaintiffs1 tax deed and quit claim deeds from 
Summit County conveyed only improvements, since that was the only 
ownership interest obtained by the County through tax 
foreclosure. Such deeds could not possibly disturb the 
separately owned and assessed underlying real property. Because 
such taxation, foreclosure and sale of improvements was an ultra 
vires act, the tax deed and quit claim deeds issued subsequent to 
the tax foreclosure of the improvements are void. Such illegal 
actions of Summit County absolutely cannot now be broadly 
construed to include the underlying real property. 
In addition to the limitations and defects set forth above, 
the Plaintiffs1 Quit Claim deeds, (Ex. 4, 5, 6), have additional 
legal limitations. In Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), 
the Court held that a grantee under a quit claim deed acquires 
only the interest of the grantor. Thus, it is beyond dispute 
that the Plaintiffs1 deeds at most conveyed only the improvements 
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since that was all Summit County owned, and not the subject real 
property. 
The public policy underlying the narrow and strict 
construction of the forfeiture of the property through the tax 
foreclosure and sale process is grounded in the Constitutional 
Prohibition against taking of property without due process of 
law,16 Courts throughout the Nation have uniformly held that in 
order to divest an owner of his property thought tax foreclosure, 
the owner must be given actual notice prior to the proceeding and 
the notice must contain a sufficient description of the property 
being foreclosed to identify and locate it.17 
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Mennonite 
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983), that not only 
must owners receive actual notice of impending tax foreclosure, 
but due process demands that all lienholders also be given actual 
notice. 
In the instant action, Plaintiffs would have this Court 
construe a 1963 tax deed issued by Summit County describing only 
improvements to include the subject real property even though the 
then owner of the subject property, United Park City Mines 
Company, paid all real property taxes assessed and levied on the 
Amendment Five, United States Constitution which is made 
applicable to actions of the State by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Article 1, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. 
17
 See Wenatachee Reclamation District v. Mustell, 665 P.2d 
909 (Wash. App. 1983); Wincrard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 
1967); Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982) 
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subject property both before and after the tax sale and obviously 
had no notice of or knowledge of any foreclosure affecting its 
ownership of the subject property. 
The result urged by Plaintiffs would clearly deprive the 
owners of the underlying real property Due Process of Law.18 
POINT IX 
PARK CITY NOT LIABLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF SHACK 
The evidence presented at trial was that Deer Valley Resort 
Company was constructing a water pipeline to its ski resort and 
engaged Lloyd Brothers Construction Company as its Contractor. 
There were several derelict and abandoned shacks which were in 
the path of the pipeline. Lloyd Brothers sought to demolish the 
shacks which were in its way. In Park City, as in most cities, a 
permit is required from the city to either construct or demolish 
a building. 
These permits are issued to contractors upon the 
contractor's representation that he is authorized by the property 
owner to conduct the activity allowed in the permit. The permit 
does not require the contractor to act and simply expires if not 
acted upon within 180 days. 
The Utah Court has also held that a purported sale for 
taxes when taxes were not delinquent was void and conveyed no 
interest whatsoever to purchasers in Mecham v. Mel-Q-Tone 
Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 403, 4364, P.2d 392 (1970). 
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Plaintiffs would misconstrue the purpose of governmental 
regulation of building activity. Building and demolition permits 
are required to regulate the construction industry and enforce 
safety codes and practices. The purpose of permits is not to 
determine whether the permittee is authorized by the owner. The 
true purpose was recognized by the New York Court of Appeals in 
its decision in Rolfe v. Village of Falconer, 467 N.E. 2d 517 
(N.Y. 1984). In Rolfe, the Court held that the purpose of 
building permits was to assure compliance with pertinent 
construction laws. The issuance of such permits is not to 
protect owners from unauthorized contractors who wrongly 
represent to the village that they have authority to obtain the 
permit. The New York Court dismissed a claim that the 
municipality was responsible because it issued a permit for the 
acts of unauthorized contractors. 
Similarly in the instant matter, the demolition permit is 
issued to assure compliance with Park City Ordinances, not to 
determine whether the permittee is authorized or to prevent 
unauthorized acts of contractors. Plaintiffs were made aware of 
the fact that Deer Valley's contractor and not Park City 
demolished the shack they claim. Plaintiffs chose to ignore this 
fact and simply failed to sue the responsible parties, Deer 
Valley Resort Company and Lloyd Brothers Construction. 
Plaintiffs1 claim that Park City destroyed the shack is simply 
not supported by the record. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs1 claim that the Trial Court erred in 
ruling that no believable evidence as to value of the shack was 
offered is also unfounded. Only one of the Plaintiffs attempted 
to place a value on the shack. After the Court had heard 
numerous witnesses testify as to the abandoned derelict and 
decrepit nature of the shack, it found such evidence as to value 
unbelievable and speculative. 
The Trial Court is well within its prerogative to view the 
demeanor of witnesses and believe or disbelieve their testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the above issues raised by the Plaintiff-
Appellants, there are other matters that the trial court decided 
and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed which support the overall 
decision that title be quieted to the State of Utah. No notice 
of claim, as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Annotated, §63-30-1, et. seq., was filed against the State 
of Utah. Therefore, the matter was dismissed as against the 
State, which was an indispensable party. With the State being 
dismissed as a party, and being indispensable to the quiet title 
case, there can be no successful claim of quieting title against 
Park City Municipal Corporation. 
Plaintiffs are asserting ancient claims, which should have 
been asserted by their ancestors decades ago hoping to undermine 
the superior title of the State. Despite the difficulties 
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inherent in trying matters which occurred many years ago, the 
State was able to prove its superior title. Neither of the 
theories put forth by the Plaintiffs, adverse possession, or 
prescriptive, are viable, and this Court should affirm the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiffs also failed to show that Park City destroyed the 
shack. In fact, it was proven at trial that an independent 
third-party destroyed the shack. This Cause of Action also 
failed at trial and on initial appeal, and this Court should 
affirm this ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1989. 
<3\^praig Sm>th 
At£o r n e^rTor 
Defendant/Respondent 
Park Ci ty Municipal 
Corpora t ion 
R. Paul Van Dam, 
Attorney General 
Alan Bachman, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
State of Utah 
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MARCHANT v. PARK CITY Utah 677 
Oil M 771 T2d 477 (Uuh App. !*•) 
9tmction of home on property. The Dis-
trict Court, Summit County, Leonard H. 
Russon, J., quieted title in the state and 
dismissed the complaint Plaintiffs appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., 
held that; (1) plaintiffs failed to establish 
title to the property by deed; (2) tax deed 
statute of limitations was inapplicable; (3) 
plaintiffs failed to prove payment of taxes 
for seven-year period necessary to claim 
adverse possession; and (4) prescriptive 
easement to the property was not estab-
lished. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <*»S42(2) 
In reviewing the trial court's conclu-
sions of law, the Court of Appeals applies a 
correction of error standard with no defer-
ence to the trial court 
• I(Y IUMMI SWIM 
=> 
Velma MARCHANT. Elma Winterton. 
Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona 
Lichty, Merle Anderson, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
PARK CITY, a municipal corporation, 
and the State of Utah, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 880131-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 13, 1989. 
Plaintiffs sued to quiet title to certain 
property and to recover damages for de-
2. Taxation «=»726 
Person who has duty to pay taxes can-
not fail to pay taxes and subsequently pur-
chase the land at tax sale and thereby 
attempt to strengthen his title to the prop-
erty. 
3. Taxation e»805<2) 
One who has tax deed but does not 
hold title to the property cannot assert the 
special statute of limitations applicable to 
tax titles. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-5.1. 
4. Adverse Possession «=»8<K2) 
For adverse possession purposes, 
plaintiffs' predecessors at most received 
title only to improvements described in 
deeds and not underlying land where lan-
guage in deeds described property as "that 
certain frame dwelling house by Lumber 
Yard" and "house in lumber yard"; title to 
real property by deed was not established 
as against the state even though the state's 
chain of title was flawed. 
5. Taxation *»726 
Quit claim deeds from county to plain-
tiffs' predecessor received after payment 
of delinquent taxes and tax deed did not 
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strengthen predecessor's title to the prop-
erty but merely indicated that he paid de-
linquent taxes on the property. 
6. Taxation «=*805<2) 
Tax deed statute of limitations did not 
apply against state's claim of ownership of 
real property where plaintiffs' predeces-
sors received quit claim deeds from county 
on various dates after paying delinquent 
taxes and received a tax deed to the im-
provements. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-5.1. 
7. Adverse Possession *=>95 
Proponent of an adverse possession 
claim has the burden of proving full statu-
tory compliance, including the payment of 
all taxes levied and assessed. 
8. Adverse Possession *»94 
If party in possession of property and 
his predecessors have paid taxes based on 
value of improvements on the property and 
no taxes have been levied based on valua-
tion of the landt party has established title 
to the property by adverse possession if all 
other elements of adverse possession are 
met. 
9. Adverse Possession *=»95 
Payment of taxes for seven-year peri-
od necessary for adverse possession was 
not proven by tax deeds and letter which 
indicated only that predecessor had paid 
delinquent taxes on personal property at 
various tax sales and that taxes were as-
sessed but not paid during years plaintiffs 
claimed to have established title by adverse 
possession and evidence that predecessor 
paid taxes on improvements for three years 
during period in which state's predecessor 
in title paid real property taxes on underly-
ing land. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-7.1. 
10. Advene Possession *=»94 
Payment of delinquent taxes at a tax 
sale cannot be used to establish the pay-
ment of taxes necessary to a successful 
claim of adverse possession. U.C.A.1963, 
78-12-7.1. 
11. Easements *=H1 
Prescriptive easement does not result 
in ownership but allows only use of proper-
ty belonging to another for a limited pur-
pose. 
12. EasemenU «=»36(3) 
Claimant of prescriptive easement has 
the burden of proving the necessary ele-
ments by clear and convincing evidence, 
13. Appeal and Error *=>901 
Appellants claiming prescriptive east* 
ment contrary to trial court findings we*% 
required to marshal! all evidence supports 
ing the trial court's findings and then to 
demonstrate that the evidence, when 
viewed most favorafc^ y to the trial court, 
was insufficient; appellants were required 
to marshall evidence which would support 
each element required to prove their claim 
of prescriptive easement 
14. Appeal and Error *»756, 760(1) 
Court of Appeals will not consider eon-
elusory arguments without citation to ei-
ther the record or cases involving pivotal 
issues. 
15. Appeal and Error •=•173(9, 10) 
Issues of laches and estoppel which 
were not raised in the trial court would not 
be considered on appeal. 
Robert Felton, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs-appellants. 
J. Craig Smith, James W. Carter, Park 
City, for Park City. 
Alan Bachman, Salt Lake City, for State. 
OPINION 
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD 
and ORME, JJ. - - - - - - - - - ; 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants challenge the trial court's rul-
ing that they did not have vested title to 
certain real property in Park City and thus 
were not entitled to recover damages for 
destruction of the home on the property. 
Appellants claim that they have title to 
property through adverse possession, deed* 
or alternatively, that their use was prijj 
criptive. Accordingly, they claim entftfl^  
ment to $20,000 in damages for the dq 
struction of the residence on the property 
We affirm. t^ 
MARCHANT v. 
Cite M 771 ?2d 677 
In August of 1981, Park City issued a 
demolition permit to Deer Valley Resort to 
remove a building. The building was de-
molished by Lloyd Brothers Construction 
Company between August 4 and Septem-
ber 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access 
road to Deer Valley Resort Appellants 
brought this action seeking to quiet title to 
the real property and to recover damages 
for the destruction of the home located on 
the property. 
According to appellants, their grandfa-
ther, William Rolfe, possessed the home 
and yard on the property from 1910 until 
his death in 1939. After his death, his wife 
continued to occupy the property until 
1946. She died in about 1949. William 
Rolfe's son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the 
house from 1949 until about 1964. Charles 
Rolfe died in 1966 and his wife, Ethel 
Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfe's daugh-
ters, appellants, claim to have visited the 
property at least once a year since 1964. 
In support of their claim that they have 
vested title to the property, appellants rely 
on the following documents: 
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and 
Belle McPolin to Jesse McCarrell dated 
March 19, 1906 for ''that certain one-story 
framed, three-room dwelling house situated 
on the easterly side of Silver Creek and 
about 100 feet easterly from the lumber-
yard of the Summit Lumber Company." 
2. A quit claim de^ d from Summit 
County to William Rolph [sic] dated June 
10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[improvements 
East U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The 
quit claim deed states that the deed is 
"made from title secured from a tax sale in 
the year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to 
Summit County, dated May 1st, 1914." 
3. A quit claim deed from Summit 
County to William Rolfe dated June 21, 
1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame 
dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park 
City, Summit County, Utah, assessed to 
William Rolfe in the year 1912." 
4. A letter from the Summit County 
Treasurer to Charles Rolfe dated May 16, 
1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued 
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfe's father. 
The letter also stated that from 1940 to 
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1954, taxes were taken care of by widows 
abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid tax-
es of $8.06 in 1955 and $7.33 in 1956. 
5. A tax deed from Summit County to 
Charles Rolfe dated June 13, 1963 for 
"House in lumber yard," stating "[tjhis 
conveyance is made in consideration of pay-
ment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.53 
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and 
costs, constituting a charge against said 
real estate for the year 1958 in the sum of 
$7.81." 
The State of Utah claims chain of title 
through a series of documents, all of which 
were recorded, and all, except numbers 3, 4 
and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds 
description of the property. The doc-
uments are as follows: 
1. A patent from the United States 
government, undisputedly containing the 
property in question, to George Snyder on 
April 5, 1882. 
2. A deed from George Snyder to the 
Park City Smelting Company, dated No-
vember 14, 1883. 
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting 
Company to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. 
Hollister on September 21, 1912. The deed 
did not contain a metes and bounds descrip-
tion, but described the conveyed property 
as "all of the real property or rights or 
interest in real property belonging to the 
Park City Smelting Company and situated 
in the County of Summit, Utah." 
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis 
H. Withey's estate to Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company on November 5, 1926. The 
deed did not have a metes and bounds 
description, but conveyed "all the estate, 
right, title, interest, property, claim and 
demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. 
Withey . . . [of] the property above de-
scribed." 
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister, 
Withey's tenant in common, to Silver King 
Coalition Mines on February 18, 1927. The 
deed did not contain a metes and bounds 
description but described the property as 
"all other real property or rights or inter-
ests in real property . . . belonging to Park 
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City Smelting Company, and situated in the 
County of Summit, State of Utah." 
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company to United Park City Mines 
Company, dated May 8, 1953. 
7. A deed from United Park City Mines 
Company to Park City, dated April 2, 1969. 
8. A deed from Park City to the State 
of Utah, dated June 7, 1982. 
There was no evidence that anyone other 
than William Rolfe paid taxes on the prop-
erty until 1931. From 1931 to 1953, the 
real property in question was assessed as 
part of Silver King Coalition Mines Compa-
ny. From 1954 to 1969, real property taxes 
were assessed to and paid by United Park 
City Mines. 
The trial court found that appellants' 
chain of title was discontinuous and, at 
best, conveyed title to improvements on the 
property only. The court concluded that 
the State's claim to title of the property 
was superior to that of appellants and, 
therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah 
and dismissed appellants' complaint 
On appeal, appellants assert that 1) the 
trial court erred in finding that they did not 
have vested title to the property by deed or 
adverse possession; 2) even if appellants 
do not have title to the property, they es-
tablished prescriptive use; 3) respondents 
are barred from challenging appellants' tax 
title by the statute of limitations set forth 
in Utah Code Ann- j 78-12-5.1 (1987); and 
4) respondents' claims are barred by laches 
and estoppel 
Vested Title 
Appellants first claim on appeal that the 
trial court erred in concluding they did not 
have vested title to the property by deed. 
Appellants assert they obtained tax title to 
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit 
claim deed and the 1963 tax deed from 
Summit County, and any action challenging 
that title is barred by the four year statute 
of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-6.1 (1987). In addition, they claim 
title under the Marketable Record Title 
Act Utah Code Ann. 5 57-9-1 through -10 
(1986), commencing with the 1917 quit 
claim deed as the "root" of title. The trial 
court concluded that the tax deeds under 
which appellants claimed title did not con-
vey title to the underlying real property. 
[1-3] In reviewing the trial court's con-
clusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard with no deference to the 
trial court Creer v. Valley Bank and 
Trust Co., 770 P.2d 113 (1988). A person 
who has a duty to pay taxes cannot fail to 
pay taxes and subsequently purchase the 
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to 
strengthen his title to the property. Dill-
man v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
1982); Crofts v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 350, 
313 P.2d 808, 810 (1957). In addition, one 
who has a tax deed but does not hold title 
to the property cannot assert the special 
statute of limitations contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987). Dillman, 
656 P.2d at 978-79. 
[4-6] In this case, there is no indication 
that William Rolfe was the record titlehold-
er. Even assuming he received quit claim 
deeds from Summit County^ 1914, 1917 
and 1957 after paying delinquent taxes, we 
agree with the trial court that, at most, he 
received title to the improvements de-
scribed in the deeds. The 1963 tax deed, 
similarly, conveyed only the improvements, 
not the underlying real property. Taxes at 
that time were apparently separately as-
sessed on improvements and real property 
in Summit County, and the State's prede-
cessor in title, United Park City Mines, paid 
real property taxes from 1954 to 1969. 
The deeds did not strengthen Roife's title 
to the property, but merely indicated that 
he paid delinquent taxes on the property. 
The State's title, on the other hand, while 
flawed, is clearly superior to that of appel-
lants. Therefore, we hold that the trial 
court did not err in concluding that appel-
lants failed to establish title to the property 
by deed and that the tax deed statute of 
limitations was inapplicable. 
Adverse Possession 
[7,8] Appellants' second assertion of 
error is that the trial court erred in finding 
that appellants did not have title to the 
property by adverse possession. The pro-
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pouent of an advene possession claim has 
the burden of proving full statutory compli-
ance, including the payment of all taxes 
levied and assessed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 
P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979). However, if a 
party in possession of property and his 
predecessors have paid taxes based on the 
value of improvements on the property and 
no taxes have been levied based on the 
valuation of the land, the party has estab-
lished title to the property by adverse pos-
session if all other elements of adverse 
possession are met Park West Village, 
Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Utah 
1986); see also Royal Street Land Co. v. 
Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987). 
In Avise, the trial court found that Mrs. 
Lake failed to acquire title to property be-
cause she failed to pay taxes on the proper-
ty. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, 
stating that the trial court's finding that 
Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on the prop-
erty was contrary to the evidence. The 
court noted that an employee of the Sum-
mit County assessor's office testified at 
trial that he had searched the records in 
that office and could find no evidence that 
any taxes had been assessed on the land 
prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence 
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax 
notice every year and paid the tax that was 
levied Although those taxes were based 
only on the value of the improvements on 
the property, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that because no other taxes were levied, 
Mrs. Lake had "paid all taxes levied and 
assessed" in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. i 78-12-12 (1977). The court also 
noted that there was no evidence that there 
were any delinquent taxes owing on the 
land for the years prior to 1975 or that the 
land had been sold by the County for fail-
ure to pay taxes for those years. 
[9,10] Appellants claim that this case is 
indistinguishable from Avise. We dis-
agree. In Avise, unlike this case, Mrs. 
Lake established that she had paid taxes on 
the improvements to the property for twen-
ty-three years. In this case, however, the 
only evidence that appellants' predecessors 
had paid taxes on the property for seven 
continuous years were quit claim and tax 
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deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to 
Charles Rolfe. There was no evidence that 
taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At 
best, the deeds and letter indicate that Wil-
liam Rolfe paid delinquent taxes on the 
personal property at various tax sales. 
Further, appellants established that 
Charles Rolfe paid taxes on improvements 
on the property in 1955, 1956 and 1958, but 
it was also proven that real property taxes 
were paid by Silver King Coalition Mines 
Company those same years. Thus, unlike 
Avise, appellants failed to prove that they 
paid taxes on the home or on the underly-
ing land for a continuous seven year peri-
od See Utah Code Ann. $ 78-12-7.1 
(1987). Payment of delinquent taxes at a 
tax sale cannot be used to establish the 
payment of taxes necessary to a successful 
claim of adverse possession. Otherwise, 
anyone purchasing property at a tax sale 
would be able to claim the number of years 
taxes had gone unpaid as a credit on the 
seven year period required for adverse pos-
session. In addition, in contrast to Avise, 
the quit claim deeds themselves establish 
that taxes were assessed and not paid dur-
ing the years appellants claim to have es-
tablished title by adverse possession. 
Therefore, we hold that appellants failed to 
sustain their burden of proving payment of 
taxes for the requisite seven year period, 
and the trial court correctly concluded that 
appellants did not acquire the property by 
adverse possession. 
Prescriptive Easement 
[11-14] Appellants also assert that 
even if they do not have fee title to the 
property by adverse possession or chain of 
title, they have a prescriptive easement 
Appellants are unclear as to what they 
claim flows from the alleged prescriptive 
easement If they claim that a prescriptive 
easement, if established, would give them 
ownership rights in the underlying proper-
ty, they err. See Osborn <& Caywood 
Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 
(Colo.CtApp.1983). A prescriptive ease-
ment does not result in ownership, but 
allows only use of property belonging to 
another for a limited purpose. North Un* 
ion Canal Co. v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 
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(Utah 1976). A preemptive easement 
"arises under our common law from a use 
Q! tbe servient estate that te 'open, notori-
ous, adverse, and, continuous for a period 
of 20 yean.'" Crone a Crone, 688 P.2d 
1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting / m j m * 
Broum, 689 P.2d 150, 162 (Utah 1981)). 
The trial court concluded that appellants 
had not established a prescriptive ease-
ment1 A clamant of prescriptive ease-
ment most establish the necessary ele-
ments by clear and convincing evidence. 
Garmond * /ft**** 91 NJL 646, 579 
P.2d 178, 178 (1978). .Appellants not only 
had the burden of proof at trial, but, on 
appeal art similarly required to marsball 
all evidence supports** the trial court's 
findings,and then to demonstrate that the 
evidence, when viewed most favorably to 
the trial court, is insufficient Scharfv. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). Appellants have not marshalled the 
evidence supporting the trial court's find-
ings in connection with the issue of pres-
criptive easement It further follows that 
on appeal, appellants are required to mar-
shal! evidence which would support each 
element required to prove their claim of 
prescriptive easement For example, the 
trial court found that appellants' predeces-
sors in interest worked for Silver King 
Coalition Mines Company, and were given 
permission by the company to build a house 
on the property in question. Appellants 
claim that this finding is not-supported by 
the evidence but they do not provide other 
argument or reference to the trial record to 
establish that the use was "adverse," one 
of the required elements for prescriptive 
easement Similarly, appellants have not 
compiled evidence which establishes the 
other necessary elements and have further 
failed to analyze what rights or claims to 
dasnag^a-txA^ut flew tiom tt» aQegedptea-
cripthre easement We will not consider 
conchsory arguments without citation to 
either the record or cases involving pivotal 
issues, Randall * Salvation Army, 100 
Nov. 466. 686 P.2d 241,244 (1984). There-
L The court slso concluded thst the prescriptive 
easement dsim was Birred by Utah Code Ann. |,7MM(1967). However, in MorHt%BbaU, 
49 Utah 244 141 P» 1127 (1916), the Utah Si> 
fore, we find that appellants did not estab-
lish a prescriptive easement to the proper-
ty. 
Caches and Estoppel 
[15] Finally, appellants assert that Park 
City is baited from claiming ownership of 
the property by laches and estoppel. 
Those issues were not raised in the trial 
court and, therefore, we decline to reach 
them. See Jame$ * Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 
801 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
Affirmed/ 
DAVIDSON and ORME, JJ„ concur. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY, a Municipal 
corporation, JACK COPPEDGE, 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 7174 
The above case was tried, commencing May 6, 1937. The 
Court received evidence by way of testimony, exhibit, and stipula-
tion, and after hearing final arguments of counsel, took the 
matter under advisement. The Court has now reviewed the evidence 
and law in this matter, and renders its Memorandum Decision 
as follows: 
1. The defendants1 title to the underlying property in 
question, even with the claimed Michigan Trust Company gap, 
is superior to the title line claimed by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants1 title is traceable to the patent of the United States 
Government. Plaintiffs1 title is insufficient in description 
and continuity. The plaintiff does not have title to the underlying 
property. Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improve-
ments on the underlying property. 
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13. Plaintiffs make nc claim against the State of Utah 
for removal or destruction of the house. 
14. Even if plaintiffs had established liability on a 
party hereto for destruction of the house in question, the evidence 
of such damage is insufficient for an award to be made. There 
was no evidence presented as to the value of this old building, 
and no finding could be made without gross speculation in regards 
thereto. 
15. Furthermore, the plaintiffs1 claims are barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq. 
No notices of claim were filed within one year after the claim 
arose as required by that Act. The plaintiffs were aware of 
the destroyed building prior to Labor Day 1981. No notice of 
claim was ever filed against the State of Utah. Notice of claim 
was filed against Park City on September 20, 1982, more than 
one year after the plaintiffs learned of the destruction of 
the building. The very latest the claim could arise was at 
that time. 
16. Title to the land in question is quieted in the defen-
dants (State of Utah). Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages 
against these defendants. 
Attorney for the defendant Park City will prepare the appro-
priate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and 
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This matter came on regi ilarl y for Tr l a] on lla;; 6 ] 987 
before the Courr ' >• ! Honorable Le«:: >i ia"": « i ' ' "' ?i ; : • .1 ' » 1 ?• t r i c t 
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Assistant City Attorney and James \ J Carterf E, • .• \ , 
"v t:torney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation, 
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State Robert Felton, Fsq,, tor the Plaintiffs, 
Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona Liechty 
and Merle R. Anderson. 
At the Trial the Court received evidence by way of 
testimony, exhibit and stipulation and heard argument by 
counsel representing the respective parties. 
Having given full consideration to all of the testimony 
heard and evidence admitted and having reviewed the legal 
memoranda and heard the oral argument, and now being 
appraised as to all and singularly the law and the facts of 
the matter, the Court herewith makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property in question which was the 
subject of this action is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40,9" West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29,15M East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58'45" 
East 70,93 feet; thence South 55°6'25" West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2. The chain of title through which Defendant State 
of Utah claims title to the real property in question is 
traceable to the patent derived from the United States 
Government. 
3. The real property in question was previously owned 
by Silver King Coalition Mines Company. It was a common 
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practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow 
miners to construct houses on real property the Company 
owned. 
4. Plaintiffs* predecessors in interest worked for 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to 
construct a house on the real property in question. 
5. The underlying real property in question was 
assessed by Summit County separately from the house located 
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs, 
6. Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real 
property taxes assessed against the underlying real property 
in question. 
7. Neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in 
interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in 
question. 
8. Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real 
property in question for a period in excess of seven years 
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and 
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited 
by Plaintiffs. 
9. The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim 
title to the real property in question is discontinuous. 
10. The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title 
were given by Summit County pursuant to unpaid tax 
delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying 
real property in question. 
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11. The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs' 
predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not 
a party to this action. 
12. Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature 
of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition 
permit for the demolition of the house, on proper 
application, to a third party claiming ownership of the 
house* 
13. There was no evidence presented as to the value of 
the house and no finding as to the value can be made without 
gross speculation. 
14. Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the 
house prior to September 7, 1981. 
15. No notice of claim was ever filed by the 
Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah. 
16. Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park 
City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the 
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The chain of title through which the Defendant 
State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title 
through which Plaintiffs claim title, 
2. Plaintiffs' claim to title by deed to the 
underlying real property in question, fails due to 
insufficient descriptions in the claimed deeds and a lack 
of continuity of Plaintiffs' claimed chain of title. 
Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improvements 
located upon the real property in question. 
3. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no 
effect on title to the underlying real property in question. 
4. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the underlying real property in question add nothing to 
the title of the Plaintiffs1. 
5. Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant 
Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or 
against Defendant State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended. 
6. Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in 
question by adverse possession and claim of easement by 
prescription are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953 
as amended. 
7. Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is 
barred by Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated 5 63-30-1, 
et. seq. 
8. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Park City 
Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-1, et, seq. 
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9. Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession of the 
real property in question fails, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show 
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon the real property in question according to law. 
10. Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the 
real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail 
since possession by Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest was 
not adverse to the interests of Defendants' predecessors in 
interest. 
11. Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the 
entire area of the real property in question fails as 
inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use 
rather than possession of or title to real property. 
12. Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs 
for issuing a demolition permit, based on proper 
application, notwithstanding whether the permit was 
wrongfully obtained or the demolition work unlawfully 
performed. 
13. Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State 
of Utah for the destruction of the house. 
14. Plaintiffs' complaint, and each cause thereof, 
should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real 
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah 
free and clear of any interest, lien, easement, or 
encumbrance by Plaintiffs. 
-6-
15. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants. 
Wherefore, let judgment be entered in favor of the 
Defendants and against the Plaintiffs in accordance with 
these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Dated this <£#L day of June, 1987 
By the Court 
5/ticker 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
XZJ Cr^ Tfe Staitn, Esq, 
C^Attorney for Defendai a torn endant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
Alan Bachman, Esq. 
for Defendant 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. J 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. : 
PARK CITY, a municipal ] 
corporation, JACK ; 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE 
OF UTAH, : 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
' Civil No. 7174 
) Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, 
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had 
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective 
positions. The parties appeared through, and were 
represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James V. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney, for Defendant Park City Municipal 
Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General 
for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for 
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, 
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson. 
Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit: 
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were 
made by respective counsel and legal memoranda were 
submitted. 
Having given full consideration to the evidence 
admitted, the legal memoranda submitted, and the oral 
argument made, the Court having entered a Memorandum 
Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Complaint, and each cause thereof, is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Fee ownership of the real property in question, 
which is particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-auarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36*40f9" West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29l15,f East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58l45,f 
East 70.93 feet; thence South S S ^ ^ " West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien, 
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs, 
3. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and 
costs of court. 
4. This is a final and appealable judgment. 
DATED this _£ day of J-tttreT 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
Sf ^cmtr F, \jui\ktr)Scn 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
k \ Craij^mi^k/Esd. torri^y^or Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
& 
<%• LJU^ 
Bachman, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Seaitf oj 
Felton,. Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT 7 
No person shall be held to answer for . 
crime, unless on a presentment oYjZm*f ' O P „ o t h e r w i f e WMMW. 
>n cases ansin* in the land or naval W e t °f- * G r a o d J u r * « « * 
actual service in time of W.r or nublfc ? ' " 10 t h e M U i * . * h « « 
be subject for the same offence to L t l / d a n * W ; n o r sh»U " 7 person 
nor shall be compelled i?Z£ *%i! >* ln * w ^ « Ut/Jumb. 
himself, nor be deprived of iff/ S i ! Case t o b e • witness against 
of Uw; nor shall private property * ukJ^'L**™ d u e P"«» 
compensation. v 7 De t a l t e n f°r public use, without just 
AMENDMENT XIV Section 1. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ART. I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
CHAPTER 12 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years neces-
sary. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall 
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven 
years before the commencement of the action. 
78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, 
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been 
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under writ-
ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claim-
ing a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, 
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument 
or judgment. 
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land 
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no 
other, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under 
written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming 
title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
<3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, em-
bankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig-
nated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and 
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(c) Affirmative defenses- In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, iryury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he haa 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsec-
tion 63-30-11(4). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I day of November, 1989, 
four copies of the foregoing document were mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid to: 
Robert Felton, Esq, 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JCS.429 ^ 
